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Recent Developments in "Takings"
Jurisprudence
Land Use Regulatory "Takings" Revisited:
The New Supreme Court Approaches
by
CRAIG A. PETERSON*
Intelligent, well-informed public officials may in good faith disagree
about the validity of specific types of land use regulation. Even the
wisest lawyers would have to acknowledge great uncertainty about the
scope of this Court's takings jurisprudence. Yet, because the Court
recently held that monetary damages are recoverable for regulatory
takings, local governments and officials must pay the price for the nec-
essarily vague standards in this area of the law.'
One of the important theories2 for attacking a land-use regulation
3
* Professor of Law, John Marshall Law School. B.A. 1963, Cornell; J.D. 1966
Harvard.
1. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3163 (1987) (Stevens, J. dis-
senting) (citation omitted).
2. As the case discussions will make clear, however, these "taking" allegations are very
difficult to prove. Largely for that reason, a far more common theory of attack is that the
enactment constitutes a denial of substantive due process, which is different conceptually from
a violation of the takings clause. As Rathkopf notes:
Denial of substantive due process may be found when a restriction in an ordinance
constitutes an unauthorized exercise of the police power in that (1) The purpose of
the restriction does not fall within the ambit of those purposes for which the zoning
power has been conferred[;] (2) The manner of achieving a permitted purpose has not
been authorized[;J (3) The restriction goes so far as to confiscate the most substantial
part of the value of the property or deprives its owner of all reasonable use thereofi;]
(4) It is arbitrary in that it fails to achieve the purpose for which it wasintended.
1 RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 4.02, at 4-3 (4th ed. 1987). A fact
pattern falling within one of those four categories, especially category (3), might at the same
time also be a potential violation of the just compensation clause; if so, both theories may be
pled. Other constitutional principles less frequently argued in land use cases include proce-
dural due process and equal protection.
3. Most of these governmental enactments take the form of local land use ordinances,
such as those governing zoning, subdivision, or development permits. The most widely used
land use control technique is zoning. Zoning classifications are embodied in municipal or
county ordinances setting forth a series of restrictions on use and development of parcels clas-
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or decision 4 is that the enactment or decision constitutes a de facto "tak-
ing" of property for the public good. Governmental action rarely in-
volves a physical occupation of land, as would be the case if the
government exercised its power of eminent domain to acquire and pay
for the property. Nevertheless, under some circumstances, even such
nonphysical actions--defended by the government as a noncompensable
regulation under the police power-can be judicially deemed a taking
under the just compensation clause5 of the fifth amendment as applicable
to the states and local governments by incorporation into the fourteenth
amendment of the United States Constitution. 6 Although most land-use
litigation occurs in state courts, federal constitutional theories, including
the taking theory, are regularly asserted in these forums.
Since 1978, the year it decided the seminal case of Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City,7 the United States Supreme Court
has attempted to refine the criteria for regulatory takings. Until the sum-
mer of 1987, the Court's opinions were generally structured as special-
ized applications of the standards enunciated in Penn Central. It is now
clear that the Court is evolving new approaches that utilize, but expand,
the traditional analysis. It is also apparent that a wide chasm exists be-
sified by geographic location. Interested parties frequently challenge the grant or denial of a
zoning reclassification (generally known as a "rezoning") or the validity of existing restric-
tions. The fact patterns underlying the cases discussed in this Article suggest a breadth of
other categories of governmental decisions contested by dissatisfied parties, generally the af-
fected landowners.
4. Examples of governmental decisions not embodied in ordinances include: variances,
adopted generally by an administrative board, to loosen restrictions that would be unfair by
reason of unnecessary hardship, such as very unusual topography; special use permits, often
adopted by a board where a particular use is authorized after a hearing upon its probable
impact on the area; decisions of a building department official interpreting a zoning ordinance
or acting on applications for building permits.
5. "[P]rivate property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation."
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
6. A related theory often advanced to contest a regulation that goes too far is that it
constitutes a violation of a just compensation clause of a state constitutional provision. Most
state constitutions have such a clause, often in words identical to that of the U.S. Constitution.
A recent, well-reasoned example can be found in Corrigan v. City of Scottsdale, 149 Ariz. 538,
541, 720 P.2d 513, 515 (1986). There, the landowners purchased a parcel for two million
dollars, which was then annexed by Scottsdale and zoned for single-family development. Four-
teen years later, the land was rezoned into two portions: 74% of the land was to be open space
and only the remainder could be developed, but to a density level augmented by transferring
certain "development rights" from the open space portion. An intermediate state appellate
court found a regulatory "taking" under both the Arizona and the U.S. Constitutions; the
Arizona Supreme Court affirmed that conclusion, and decided that the state constitution re-
quired the payment of money damages for the period between the enactment and its invalida-
tion. This Article focuses exclusively on the just compensation clause of the U.S. Constitution
as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.
7. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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tween Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia on the one hand and
Justices Brennan and Marshall on the other, regarding the role of the
judiciary in reviewing the economic impact of land-use and zoning regu-
lations under the just compensation clause.
A dramatic 1987 decision, First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,8 significantly heightened
the importance of the regulatory takings analysis. The Court held for the
first time that once a landowner proves that a taking has occurred, the
local government must pay money damages for the temporary period be-
tween the government's act and its invalidation under the just compensa-
tion clause.9 This remedy issue had been lurking for years, but for
procedural reasons, four earlier cases had not been deemed ripe for adju-
dicating the issue.10
Interest groups underscored the significance of the First English
holding. Counsel for the National Association of Home Builders re-
marked: "It's a terrific decision. This will have a deterrent effect on
those governments that know they're going too far. They're going to be
more careful now about enacting draconian land use regulations."'" On
the other side of the issue were such groups as the National League of
Cities, whose general counsel commented with alarm: "[The decision] is
very threatening and dangerous." 12 A more sanguine view was expressed
in a New York Times editorial:
A new Supreme Court decision wisely shifts the current balance
of law on the ticklish conflict between a landowner's right to use land
freely and government's need to regulate that use in the public interest
It remains to be seen whether the decision will inhibit local gov-
ernments from imposing regulations for fear of having to compensate
property owners. Yet it clearly marks a turning point.13
Interestingly, the unusual procedural posture of the case required
the Court to remand it to the California state courts. On remand the
California Municipal Court is to determine whether a taking had oc-
curred as a result of a temporary building moratorium that allegedly de-
8. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
9. Id. at 2385-89.
10. McDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986); Williamson
Country Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985); San Diego Gas
& Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
11. Top Court Deals Blow to Limits on Land Use, Chicago Sun Times, June 10, 1987, at
12.
12. Id.
13. The Court's New Balance on Land Use, N.Y. Times, June 11, 1987, at A26, col. 1.
January 1988]
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nied all reasonable economic use of the former camp and conference
center property-in which case, money damages would be recoverable.
Previously, the California state courts had dismissed the taking count in
the complaint on the grounds that under California law, invalidation was
the exclusive remedy for an unconstitutional taking, thus barring recov-
ery of money damages. While reversing the state courts on the tempo-
rary damages issue, the Supreme Court did not address the standards for
analyzing whether a taking had occurred, nor did it apply the facts of the
case to those existing standards. The Court stated:
We accordingly have no occasion to decide whether the ordinance at
issue actually denied appellant all use of its property or whether the
county might avoid the conclusion that a compensable taking had oc-
curred by establishing that the denial of all use was insulated as part of
the State's authority to enact safety regulations. These questions, of
course, remain open for decision on remand we direct today.
14
While there had been hints of the direction the Court would take
when it finally decided the damages issue for temporary takings,1 5 few
were prepared for the surprise analysis of Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission, 16 a case decided two weeks after First English. In Nollan,
the Supreme Court announced a new emphasis on closer judicial scrutiny
of land-use regulations challenged under the taking clause. Justice
Scalia, writing for the majority of five, concluded that to pass muster
under the just compensation clause, an enactment must bear a substantial
relationship to a valid public purpose, not merely a rational relationship,
the common standard in due process and equal protection challenges. 
7
Read together, these two new cases strongly suggest the need for a
thoughtful review and analysis of the Supreme Court jurisprudence
through the 1986-87 term in this rapidly evolving area of constitutional
and land-use law. If governments are to be held financially liable for
regulations and ordinances held to be even temporarily confiscatory, it is
essential for government officials, professional planners, landowners, as
well as taxpayers that there be some clear indices concerning what in fact
constitutes a taking of property.
This Article seeks to foster a better understanding of these recent
14. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2384-85 (citation omitted).
15. Justice Brennan's dissent in San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450
U.S. 621 (1981), which forcefully argued the logic of compensation for temporary takings, was
widely interpreted as an indication that a majority of the Court found constitutional validation
for such a damage remedy. The dissent has often been quoted in state court decisions as a
rationale for granting money damages. See, e.g., Corrigan v. City of Scottsdale, 149 Ariz. 538,
541, 720 P.2d 513, 515 (1986).
16. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
17. Id. at 3146.
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decisions by exploring their historic roots. Section I explores the
Supreme Court's takings jurisprudence by examining the application of
each prong of the three prong test set out in the Penn Central case. Sec-
tion II then examines the Court's most recent takings cases and suggests
a framework for understanding the Court's new direction. Finally in sec-
tion III, the Article presents some thoughts on the potential import of
the 1987 takings cases.
I. Pre-Nollan "Takings" Jurisprudence
A. The Need for Ad Hoc, Factual Inquiries to Determine Whether a
Challenged Regulation Constitutes a Taking
Since the 1922 case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 1 8 it has been
clear that the just compensation clause was designed to promote bal-
anced fairness and justice to property owners and the public. In this
famous case familiar to all constitutional law students, Justice Holmes
concluded that a regulation that "goes too far" upsets that balance and
becomes a taking under the just compensation clause. 19 This is not the
place to re-argue the meaning and precedential value of Holmes' oft-
cited pronouncements. 20 It is enough for present purposes to point out
that Holmes failed to set forth guidelines for determining what would
constitute "too far" in a given case.
In 1978, the Court in Penn Central attempted to fill this void by
prescribing a test for determining when a regulation constitutes an un-
compensated taking. The property involved was as famous as it was val-
uable: Grand Central Terminal in New York City. Under a City
Landmark Preservation Law, an administrative commission had desig-
nated the terminal as a historical landmark, principally because of its
design. The owners desired to build a high-rise office building in the air
space above the terminal, but were denied permission under the city law.
One of several constitutional arguments advanced by the owner was that
the restrictions went "too far" because they destroyed the value of the
property and therefore constituted a taking.
The Court reviewed its jurisprudence and concluded that past cases
gave rise to a multifaceted test to decide whether a taking had occurred:
18. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
19. Id. at 415.
20. See, for example, the delightfully titled but overly polemic interchange among some
of the leading land use law scholars and practitioners: White, Smith, Siemon, Mandelker &
Babcock, The White River Junction Manifesto, 9 VT. L. REV. 2 (1984) and Berger & Kanner,
Thoughts on the White River Manifesto: A Reply to the "Gang of Five's" Views on Just Compen-
sation for Regulatory Taking of Property, 19 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 685 (1986).
January 1988]
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[In] engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries, the Court's
decisions have identified several factors that have particular signifi-
cance. The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and,
particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with dis-
tinct investment backed expectations are, of course, relevant considera-
tions. So, too, is the character of the governmental action. A "taking"
may more readily be found when the interference with property can be
characterized as a physical invasion by government, than when inter-
ference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and
burdens of economic life to promote the common good.
2 1
Applying this test to the facts in Penn Central, the Court held that no
taking had occurred, primarily because the owner's existing use of the
property was profitable (although less profitable than it would have been
under the proposed high-rise plan) and the denial of permission did not
interfere with the owner's primary expectation of using the land as a
terminal.
22
In 1984, the Court stated what was implicit in Penn Central: the
relative significance of the three factors will vary from case to case, 23 but
always with a view to furthering the purposes of the just compensation
clause. "The purpose of forbidding uncompensated takings of private
property for public use is 'to bar Government from forcing some people
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be
borne by the public as a whole.' "124
B. Factor One: The Economic Impact of the Regulation
This factor focuses on the practical consequences of the challenged
ordinance or other governmental act. Penn Central itself is the best start-
ing point to understanding this portion of the analysis. There, the facts
involved the denial of plans to expand existing uses. Citing previous
cases, the Court made three observations of considerable utility in tak-
ings litigation. First, even severe loss of value would not necessarily con-
stitute a taking. 25 Second, in determining what loss is actually suffered,
the property as a whole must be considered, not divided into its parts.
21. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
22. Id. at 136.
23. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1006 (1984) (where under the facts
presented, the reasonable, investment-backed expectations factor was dispositive in determin-
ing that no taking had occurred).
24. Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1018, 1027 (1986) (quoting Arm-
strong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
25. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 125. Indeed, the Court noted several cases in which "the
challenged governmental actions prohibited a beneficial use to which individual parcels had
previously been devoted and thus caused substantial individualized harm." Id. (citing Miller
v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Goldblatt v.
Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962)).
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The Court noted: "Takings jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel
into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a par-
ticular segment have been entirely abrogated. ' 26 Third, the precise eco-
nomic impact cannot be determined until the government takes final
action; under the facts, the owner could have, but never did seek ap-
proval to construct a smaller office building that would have blended ar-
chitecturally with the existing terminal.
27
The first post-Penn Central case to examine the "economic impact"
test was Andrus v. Allard. 28 This was a strange case involving not real
estate, but bird parts incorporated into Indian artifacts. Although Nol-
lan has cast some doubt on the continued vitality of this case,29 it is an
interesting example of extreme diminution of value surviving constitu-
tional attack under the just compensation clause. In Andrus, regulations
enacted by the Secretary of the Interior prohibited sales of dead bird
parts, even though the parts had been obtained legally before the effective
dates of two protective federal statutes. Plaintiffs had incorporated the
bird parts into Indian artifacts offered for sale. They argued that if the
ban applied to them, then the regulations were unconstitutional under
the takings clause. The Supreme Court disagreed. Even though the reg-
ulation destroyed the most valuable right to the bird parts (the right to
sell), there remained economically beneficial uses such as the right to
charge admission to see them. Also, they could be donated, transported,
and devised. Therefore, some of the "bundle of sticks" comprising the
overall property interest remained.
30
The next important exposition of the Court's "economic impact"
26. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130. The Nollan majority and Keystone dissenting opinions
suggest that at least some current justices look at this factor somewhat differently. See infra
§ II.
27. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136-37.
28. 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979).
29. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3143-50.
30. Andrus, 444 U.S. at 66. This extreme effort to uphold a statute that destroyed by far
the most significant element of economic use is probably of little importance today, in light of
Hodel v. Irving, 107 S. Ct. 2076 (1987), which found a taking even though only one element of
certain property-the right to devise-was extinguished. Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice
Scalia, and Justice Powell concurred in Hodel, candidly writing in a single paragraph that:
I write separately to note that in my view the present statute, insofar as concerns the
balance between rights taken and rights left untouched, is indistinguishable from the
statute that was at issue in Andrus. Because that comparison is determinative of
whether there has been a taking in finding a taking today our decision effectively
limits Allard to its fact.
Id. at 2084-85 (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136); see also infra text accompanying notes
90-101.
"TAKINGS" REVISITEDJanuary 1988]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
criterion was in the 1980 case of Agins v. City of Tiburon,31 where the
Court upheld a sophisticated open space zoning ordinance against a fa-
cial taking challenge. The enactment permitted plaintiff landowners to
build up to five single-family homes on their parcel after review and ap-
proval by a commission and the city council, ultimate approval being
based upon a number of planning factors such as land slope. The plain-
tiffs alleged a taking because of diminution of the value of the property
even though they never applied for a development permit. The Court
agreed that if the plaintiffs were denied all economic use, then a taking
had occurred; but held that was not the case here since the plaintiffs
could apply for building permission to enable the land to be put to an
economic use as the site of at least one single-family home. Thus, the
measure was considered neither unfair nor unjust, the twin evils ad-
dressed by the just compensation clause. 32 The Court also found that the
ordinance on its face substantially advanced the legitimate governmental
interests of preserving open space and orderly development, which was of
benefit to the public generally and to the plaintiffs in particular. 33
Had the plaintiffs in Agins attempted to attack the ordinance as ap-
plied to their parcel, instead of facially, the courts could have reviewed
the economic impact only after considering evidence as to what eco-
nomic activities the government would permit. The failure to plead such
facts was fatal to the plaintiff landowner in McDonald, Sommer & Frates
v. Yolo County.34 The landowner in that case had submitted a subdivi-
sion proposal, which was rejected due to inadequate provision for such
elements as sewer and water. The owner subsequently filed a takings
claim, asserting that the denial was motivated by a governmental desire
to have an open-space buffer and to restrict the property to an agricul-
tural use for which it was not suited. The Court reasoned that only one
proposal had been rejected; another one might have been approved or,
alternatively, the county might have been willing to pay some compensa-
tion.35 The Court refused to decide the case, holding it was unripe for
adjudication: "It follows from the nature of a regulatory takings claim
that an essential prerequisite to its assertion is a final and authoritative
determination of the type and intensity of development legally permitted
on the subject property."' 36 Similarly, the Court noted that, in order to
determine whether any compensation is "just" under the Constitution,
31. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
32. Id. at 262.
33. Id. at 262.
34. 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986).
35. Id. at 2567.
36. Id. at 2566.
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judicial attention must be directed to what "compensation the responsi-
ble administrative body intends to provide."
'37
To the same general effect is Williamson County Regional Planning
Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 38 where a landowner's takings claim was
held unripe because the owner had not applied to the government for a
"hardship variance" from the strict terms of the regulations otherwise
applicable to the property.
39
(1) The Problem with Facial Attacks on an Enactment
Facial, rather than "as applied," attacks of a governmental act pres-
ent special problems in application of the economic impact factor. The
most recent example is the 1987 case of Keystone Bituminous Coal Associ-
ation v. DeBenedictis, 40 which involved a state statute barring the mining
of certain coal in order to avoid surface subsidence. The Court recog-
nized that the plaintiffs had a "heavy burden" because they claimed
"that the mere enactment of a statute constitutes a taking [rather than]
that the particular impact of government action on a specific piece of
property requires the payment of just compensation. '41 Moreover, the
plaintiffs had not alleged that continued mining operations were unprac-
ticable or unprofitable due to the state statute. Looking at the pleaded
facts, the Court found it significant that the unmineable coal was but one
portion of a larger estate of coal and surface rights with which it was
associated; and which remained economically viable.42
Another case involving a facial takings challenge, while not a land
use dispute, is worthy of note because of its analytic approach in consid-
ering a statute that destroyed economic benefit in the context of legisla-
tively determined public interest. In Connolly v. Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corp.,43 the Supreme Court upheld a federal statute that im-
posed liability for certain withdrawals from multiemployer pension
plans. The Court explicitly noted:
[T]here is no doubt that the Act completely deprives an employer of
whatever amount of money it is obligated to pay to fulfill its statutory
liability. The assessment of withdrawal liability is not made in a vac-
uum, however, but directly depends on the relationship between the
employer and the plan to which it had made contributions. Moreover,
there are a significant number of provisions in the Act that moderate
37. Id. at 2567.
38. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
39. Id. at 186-97.
40. 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987).
41. Id. at 1233.
42. Id. at 1248.
43. 106 S. Ct. 1018, 1026 (1986).
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and mitigate the economic impact of an individual employer's liability.
There is nothing to show that the withdrawal liability actually imposed
on an employer will always be out of proportion to its experience with
the plan, and the mere fact that the employer must pay money to com-
ply with the Act is but a necessary consequence of the MPPAA's
[Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980] regulatory
scheme.
4 4
To similar effect is Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation As-
sociations, Inc., 4 5 in which the Court carefully examined a mining statute
attacked as a regulatory taking. Upholding the Act, the Court reasoned:
[T]he Act does not categorically prohibit [the activity]; it merely regu-
lates the conditions under which such operations may be conducted.
The Act does not purport to regulate alternative uses to which [the]
lands may be put. Thus, in the posture in which these cases come
before us, there is no reason to suppose that "mere enactment" of the
. . . Act has deprived appellees of economically viable use of their
property.
46
(2) Proof and Pleadings of No Economic Use
What kinds of proof might persuade courts that no economic use
remains, assuming the landowner has pursued all reasonable avenues of
relief such as scaled-down proposals 47 or variances? 48 The following dis-
cussion presents a few cases suggesting some possibilities.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit was persuaded that the
uncontroverted evidence in Williamson County established proof of no
reasonable economic use.49 The plaintiff's appraiser testified that the
land, which was hilly and rocky, was unsuitable for farming or for any
use other than subdivision development. The zoning regulations, how-
ever, would not permit other uses. The cost of satisfying the eight objec-
tions of the planning commission and the elimination of 409 of the
proposed 476 housing sites would, in light of the market conditions, pro-
duce a loss in excess of one million dollars upon any sale of a completed
development; the land therefore had no value.
50
The landmark remedies case of First English 51 was remanded to the
state courts to determine whether a temporary emergency ordinance bar-
ring the landowner from rebuilding flood-damaged structures which
44. Id. at 1026-27 (footnote omitted).
45. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
46. Id. at 296-97.
47. As could have been proposed in Penn Central or McDonald, Sommer & Frates.
48. This was potentially available to the plaintiff in Hamilton Bank.
49. 729 F.2d 402, 406 (6th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
50. Id.
51. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
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prior to a devastating flood had been a camp for handicapped children
and adult group meetings, constitutes a taking. On remand, the county
might well elect to argue that the absence of structures does not destroy
all use; other outdoor uses are still permitted-camping, hiking, nature
study, and group discussions are possible examples.
(3) Abatement of Public Nuisances
It appears settled that a government may destroy all economic use
of property if necessary to avoid a public nuisance and promote public
safety. The types of uses subsumed under this "nuisance exception" to
what would otherwise be a taking are quite narrow:
Courts have consistently held that a State need not provide compensa-
tion when it diminishes or destroys the value of property by stopping
illegal activity or abating a public nuisance. As Professor Epstein has
recently commented: "the issue of compensation cannot arise until the
question of justification has been disposed of. In the typical nuisance
prevention case, this question is resolved against the claimant."
'52
This nuisance exception may well be among the arguments asserted
by the county when it argues First English on remand. The flood control
ordinance at issue in that case was designed to protect all restricted land-
owners, as well as those persons and property located downstream.
Structures on the plaintiff's land could perhaps be thought of as a public
nuisance in that they could block the flow of water, thus increasing flood
levels; debris from the structures could harm downstream property; and
soil erosion might well increase if the structures were improperly con-
structed or sited. Under this approach, even if the temporary ordinance
did place a total moratorium on building and thus render the property
temporarily without economic value, the enactment would not constitute
a taking.
C. Factor Two: Whether the Enactment Constitutes a Deprivation of
Investment-Backed Expectations
In several cases since Penn Central, the Supreme Court has fleshed
out its statement that one of the factors in deciding whether a govern-
mental action violates the just compensation clause is "the extent to
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed ex-
pectations. ' 53 This curious phrase is not easily understood or applied.
Much of the case law addresses the economic impact criterion separately,
from the investment-backed expectations standard, but conceptually,
52. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1246 n.22 (1987)
(citations omitted).
53. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
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they relate closely to one another. As noted by Justice Brennan in his
Nollan dissent: "In reviewing a Takings Clause claim, we have regarded
... the economic impact of regulation, especially the extent to which regu-
lation interferes with investment-backed expectations."
54
This rather elusive concept may have had its origin in an influential
article by Professor Frank Michelman, in which he elegantly wrote that
the problem focused on whether the challenged enactment eliminated "a
discrete twig out of the fee simple bundle to which (the owner) makes
explicit reference in his own thinking, so that enforcement of the restric-
tion would, as he looks at the matter, totally defeat a distinctly crystal-
lized expectation."
'55
In Michelman's terms, restrictions are not improper where they af-
fect only desires or goals of property owners which are not "distinctly
crystallized." That concept is essentially mirrored in other Supreme
Court jurisprudence in which the Court has characterized some expecta-
tions as desires that are only "unilateral expectations or an abstract
need" not meeting the test.56 Another way of phrasing the conclusion is
that such a unilateral desire does not constitute property for purposes of
the just compensation clause.
(1) Economic Activities
Applying the investment-backed expectation standard to given facts
often requires careful analysis of the owner's economic activities on the
parcel. In Penn Central, the Court found that the landmark ordinance
did not "interfere with what must be regarded as Penn Central's primary
expectation concerning the use of the parcel," in that case operating a
profitable railroad terminal. 57 In the coal mining restrictions case of
Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis, 58 the Court con-
cluded, inter alia, that the plaintiffs' failure to plead the commercial im-
practicability of continued mining operations meant that they could still
pursue their reasonable, investment-backed expectations of engaging in
the mining business. 59 Also, for reasons unrelated to the restrictions,
54. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3156 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
55. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of
"Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. Rtv. 1165, 1230-34 (1967).
56. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1981) (citing
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (defining property interest for procedural
due process analysis)).
57. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136.
58. 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987).
59. Id. at 1247-48.
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only seventy-five percent of the total coal in the ground could be profita-
bly mined under any circumstances; the restrictions merely reduced that
percentage slightly.
60
While the Court looks carefully at existing economic activities, it
has placed little weight on a purported loss of future profits: "Prediction
of profitability is essentially a matter of reasoned speculation that courts
are not especially competent to perform. Further, perhaps because of its
very uncertainty, the interest in anticipated gains has traditionally been
viewed as less compelling than other property-related interests.
'61
(2) Reliance on Explicit Assurances
Interestingly, the leading case interpreting the "investment-backed
expectations" phrase involves not physical property but intellectual-
trade secrets. 62 This case, Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,6 3 is an espe-
cially instructive case since nonrevelation of some secrets was deemed to
be a reasonable investment-backed expectation, while other secrets did
not rise to that level of property. In that case, a federal statute explicitly
stated that the government would not disclose or use in connection with
other applications, trade secrets submitted during certain years. For
other years, however, the statute merely barred publication by govern-
ment employees. The Court held that regarding the first period, the
company had a protected expectation based on the "explicit governmen-
tal guarantee"; as to the later period, the company merely had an unpro-
tected hope of governmental nondisclosure.64 Under the Monsanto
analysis, there should be no reasonable investment-backed expectations
in such cases as McDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County,65 which
involved the denial of a subdivision permit, or First English, 66 which in-
volved a temporary moratorium after a flood.
(3) Operating in a Regulated Environment
Some land use challenges have alleged that amendments to compre-
hensive regulations of general applicability operate as takings of affected
property, in part because the landowner plaintiff had a reasonable invest-
ment-backed expectation in being permitted to develop under the previ-
ous regulations. In responding to such challenges, Monsanto and
60. Id. at 1249.
61. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979).
62. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1983).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1013.
65. 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986).
66. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
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Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.67 provide helpful analyses,
which suggest that the reasonableness of these expectations is under-
mined when a series of government enactments have controlled the de-
velopment of land for a period of time prior to purchase, especially if
those enactments have been periodically amended. Thus, in Connolly,
the affected employers were unsuccessful in convincing the Court that
they reasonably expected that the multiemployer pension program would
not be changed to impose new withdrawal liabilities:
Pension plans, however, were the objects of legislative concern long
before the passage of ERISA [Employee Retirement Income Security
Act] in 1974 .... It was also plain enough that the purpose of impos-
ing withdrawal liability was to ensure that employees would receive
the benefits promised them. When it became evident that ERISA fell
short of achieving this end, Congress adopted the 1980 amendments
.... "Those who do business in the regulated field cannot object if the
legislative scheme is buttressed by subsequent amendments to achieve
the legislative end.
''68
Monsanto has language to the same effect. In discussing the fact
that one of the burdens of operating in a civilized society is the possibility
that pesticide regulations will be amended, the Supreme Court focused
on the public significance of the regulated area:
This is particularly true in an area, such as pesticide sale and use, that
has long been the source ofpublic concern and the subject of government
regulation. That Monsanto is willing to bear this burden in exchange
for the ability to market pesticides in this country is evidenced by the
fact that it has continued to expand its research and development and
to submit data to EPA despite the enactment of the 1978 amendments
to FIFRA.
69
The same can be said concerning the use and development of land-it
has been subject to regulation since the early clays of this century and is
an issue of increasing public concern.
D. Factor Three: Character of the Governmental Action
The Supreme Court has also amplified the meaning of the third and
final Penn Central criterion: the character of the governmental action.
Most contested land use enactments involve restrictions on use or certain
aspects of development. In these situations, the property interference is
not analogous to an actual physical occupation of the property by the
public. Where the enactment approaches such physical invasion, how-
ever, a court is more likely to find a taking under the just compensation
67. 106 S. Ct. 1018 (1986).
68. Id. at 1027 (citations omitted).
69. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1007 (emphasis added).
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clause. This distinction was nicely framed in the leading case of Loretto
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CA TV Corp.,70 in which a landowner suc-
cessfully attacked a New York statute that required apartment owners to
permit cable television companies to install facilities on their property for
a fee established by a commission. The statute was regarded as creating a
"permanent physical occupation" obviating the need for the Court to
examine the factors of economic impact or investment-backed expecta-
tion. Distinguishing Penn Central, the Court created a vivid metaphor-
the permanent invasion "does not simply take a single 'strand' from the
'bundle' of property rights: it chops through the bundle, taking a slice of
every strand. '
71
(1) Public Programs Adjusting the Benefits and Burdens of Economic Life to
Promote the Public Good
What if the governmental action is not so analogous to a physical
invasion? Again, Penn Central offers guidance: "A taking may more
readily be found when the interference with property can be character-
ized as a physical invasion by government ... than when interference
arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of
economic life to promote the common good."
'72
An example of such a beneficial public program was the pension
withdrawal liability program in Connolly, which was held not to be a
taking partially for that reason. 73 Numerous similar programs have been
upheld as not involving takings, although many of these cases might be
read as precedential only as regards nuisance uses. The Court in Penn
Central mentioned several. 74 For example, in Miller v. Schoene,75 the
Supreme Court upheld an ordinance that required the cutting of cedar
trees because the legislature had determined that protecting the apple
industry from a disease carried by the cedar trees was "of greater value to
the public."' 76 In Hadacheck v. Sebastian,77 the plaintiff's existing brick-
yard was properly barred from operating because the government had
decided that it harmed the neighborhood. The Court in Penn Central
correctly noted that in each of these cases, there was no taking, even
though the most valuable use of the property was prohibited.
70. 458 U.S. 417 (1982).
71. Id. at 435.
72. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124 (citations omitted).
73. Connolly, 106 S. Ct. at 1026.
74. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 123-28.
75. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
76. Id. at 279.
77. 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
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The most recent case finding a valid public purpose reasonably re-
lated to the land-use restriction is Keystone Bitimous Coal Association v.
DeBenedictis.7 8 There the Court noted that the character of the state's
action "leaned heavily" against finding a taking. The purpose was to
prevent subsidence damage to existing public buildings, dwellings, and




An example of an analogue to physical invasion is Kaiser Aetna v.
United States. 80 The Court found a compensable taking when the federal
government attempted to force a lagoon owner to permit public access
without compensation. The Court's reasoning had two facets: first, the
right to exclude others (guaranteed by state law) was a fundamental
property right, which may be abridged only upon payment of compensa-
tion; second, there was a physical invasion by imposition of a "naviga-
tional servitude" requiring lagoon management.8 1
As this Article will discuss later,82 one of the principal disagree-
ments between the majority and dissenting Justices in Nollan was
whether requiring the grant of a limited lateral access easement over a
narrow portion of beach front property should be regarded as a physical
invasion or as a mere regulation. The same disagreement arose in Key-
stone, in which the Justices had diametrically opposing views on how to
regard the prohibition of mining of certain subsurface coal.
(3) The Agins Formulation
Agins v. City of Tiburon 8 3 does not explicitly refer either to the in-
vestment-backed expectation or to the character of governmental action
criteria in finding that the adoption of the open space zoning regulations
did not constitute a taking. Instead, the Court, in an unusually short
opinion, stated that a taking occurs if an "ordinance does not substan-
tially advance legitimate state interests, or denies an owner economically
viable use of his land."8s 4 Similar language is also found in Penn Central,
in which the Court notes that "a use restriction . . . may constitute a
'taking' if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial
78. 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987).
79. Id. at 1237.
80. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
81. Id. at 180.
82. See infra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
83. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
84. Id. at 260.
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public purpose." 85 Of course, the word "substantially" is different from
the term "reasonably" and may result in significantly different legal out-
comes, a matter to be discussed in the final section of this Article. In any
event, it would be incorrect to regard the above-quoted language from
Agins (or similar terminology in Penn Central) as a more refined way of
phrasing the character of governmental action criterion.86 Rather, it ap-
pears to be a threshold issue that should be resolved affirmatively before
the three other Penn Central standards are addressed. If that is a correct
view, then it is surprising that most of the land-use takings cases before
Nollan (with the exception of Agins) do not address it at all. The Solici-
tor General of the United States in his amicus brief filed in Nollan recog-
nized an analytical difference between the substantial-relation focus and
the three-pronged Penn Central approach. The Solicitor General argued
that because the three traditional criteria would not satisfactorily pro-
duce a well-reasoned judgment, the Court should instead adopt a "more
structured and determinate inquiry" into the relationship of the burden
imposed on the landowner and the effect of the proposed development on
the public. 87
The "substantially advance legitimate state interests" language, 88 as
we shall see, plays an important part in the quite unexpected approach
taken by the majority in Nollan as regards the standard of judicial review
in takings cases generally. For present purposes, however, it is worth
noting that Justice Powell's enumeration in Agins of the relevant and
legitimate governmental purposes (preserving open space, avoiding pre-
mature development, air pollution, congestion, hazards, and the like) de-
scribes the contours of a program designed to "adjust the benefits and
burdens of economic life for the common good."'89 Under the principles
of Penn Central, a judicial determination of a taking when the measure
reflects a balance between public and private interests would be inappro-
priate, because the enactment would not offend fairness and justice-the
twin purposes of the just compensation clause.
85. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 127.
86. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260.
87. Brief for the United States as amicus curiae at 9, Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987). The argument is considerably more sophisticated than the
summary in the text. See Brief at 21-30.
88. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260.
89. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
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II. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission: A New
Direction?
A. The Keystone Dissent as a Precursor
Some warning of the Court's disposition in Nollan-but not its new
approach to a stricter judicial scrutiny in land use regulatory takings
cases-was sounded in a four Justice dissent issued three months earlier
in Keystone.90 In that sharply worded dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist
was joined by Justices Powell, O'Connor, and Scalia (who later authored
the five Justice majority in Nollan).
The dissenters in Keystone regarded the mining prohibition as the
total destruction of an "identifiable and separable property interest" rec-
ognized by state law-the portion of the "support estate" that was left
unmineable by the regulation. 9' The property destruction was said to
have occurred because coal has no value if left unmined. The effect of
the prohibition on the landowner was indistinguishable from the effect of
the government physically taking that property. The value of the prop-
erty interest in question was completely destroyed, a result quite unlike
that in Andrus v. Allard, in which there was merely a destruction of "one
strand" of a bundle of rights, leaving other economically beneficial
strands. 92 Structuring the issue in this way, the dissenters went on to
reject the application of the three-pronged test enunciated in Penn Cen-
tral by the majority in Keystone to uphold the statute.93 Since the dis-
senters believed that the destruction of all use of a separate property
interest was clearly a taking under the just compensation clause, they
found it irrelevant to consider whether other mining operations still per-
mitted (i.e., other property interests) were profitable.94 Leading land use
practitioner and writer Fred P. Bosselman correctly notes that Keystone
is one of the recent Supreme Court cases that reflects a "wide and grow-
ing gap between the treatment of economic regulation under the taking
clause" by Justices Brennan and Marshall on one hand and Justices
Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist on the other.95
90. Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1253-61 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 1259.
92. Id. at 1258.
93. Id. at 1259.
94. Id. at 1258-59.
95. Unpublished speech to Attorneys General of certain western states, Aug. 12, 1987.
Some of the ideas as to the possible implications of the 1987 takings cases were developed
jointly from the author and Mr. Bosselman in connection with the preparation of an amicus
brief on behalf of several environmental groups and governmental associations in the First
English case.
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B. Hodel v. Irving: An Unusual, Unanimous Takings Case
In the unanimous 1987 case of Hodel v. Irving,96 Justice O'Connor
purported to apply the three Penn Central factors to a situation involving
an unusual fact pattern with interesting theoretical, but few practical eco-
nomic consequences for the affected property owners. A federal statute
provided that certain Indian lands owned in fractional shares and not
producing at least $100 in the year preceding the death of a fractional
owner of two percent of the parcel or less, would escheat to the tribe
upon the death of the owner. 97 The purpose of the enactment was to
facilitate transfers and other actions respecting the parcels. As to the
economic impact factor, the Court concluded that the parcel itself might
have substantial value, although not producing high income, and that
removing the right to devise the interests totally destroyed a separate and
distinct property right.98 As to the reasonable investment-backed expec-
tations criterion, the Court concluded that there was little if any such
expectation, which weighed against finding a taking.99 Focussing on the
character of the governmental act, the Court regarded the act as an ex-
traordinary step in abrogating a right existing since feudal days, which
would also in some cases undermine the very purpose of the statute.1°°
The apparent willingness of the entire Court to separate out a single,
though undeniably important element of ownership, is inconsistent with
the "bundle of sticks" analysis that has been an important aspect of tak-
ings jurisprudence. 10 Nollan, as we shall see, is also reflective of this
apparent shift of thinking on the nature of property in takings cases.
C. The Nollan Approaches
A narrow majority of five Justices found a taking in Nollan, a some-
what factually complex permit exaction case.102 The California Coastal
Commission, empowered to issue building development permits within a
certain distance of the California coast, granted the plaintiffs a permit to
build a home on the condition that they deed to the public an access
easement across a small portion of the beach element of their parcel, so
as to allow access between two public beaches, one on either side of the
parcel.
96. 107 S. Ct. 2076 (1987).
97. Id. at 2079.
98. Id. at 2082.
99. Id. at 2083.
100. Id.
101. See supra § I(B).
102. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
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The opinion, written by Justice Scalia, was joined by the three other
Keystone dissenters together with Justice White. The opinion initially
noted that requiring an unfettered public lateral access to traverse the
owners' property-other than as a permit condition-would have been
equivalent to a permanent physical occupation, 0 3 similar to the cable
television hookup in the Loretto case. 10 4 The majority concluded that
such a result was mandated even though there might be a very great
public benefit and little or no economic consequence to the property
owner. 1
05
In Nollan, however, the commission had not merely announced that
the access would be required; rather, it had conditioned its development
permit upon conferral by the applicants of the access rights. The Court
recognized that governments may, under the police power, further legiti-
mate public objectives, which it assumed, arguendo, were valid-such as
protecting beach views, communicating available beach access possibili-
ties, and avoiding beach congestion. The regulation, however, must
"substantially advance [the] legitimate state interests" 0 6 to comply with
the just compensation clause.' 0 7 Justice Scalia, in a vast understatement,
pointed out that "[o]ur cases have not elaborated on the standards for
determining what constitutes a 'legitimate state interest' or what type of
connection between the regulation and the state interest satisfies the re-
quirement that the former 'substantially advance' the latter.'1°8
The opinion then turned to the nexus between the purported pur-
poses and the access condition itself. In what may prove to be a very
103. Id. at 3145.
104. Justice Scalia came to this conclusion by applying a principle from Loretto itself: "the
right to exclude others is one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are
commonly characterized as property." Id. As applied in NAollan, the access right was perma-
nent and physically permitted the public to occupy the easement area.
105. Under the No//an facts, the economic loss, if any, would have been minimal. The
only argument for diminution of value centered on the intrusion of people walking across the
easement. Because of a wall built at the edge of the beach portion of the property, an occa-
sional passersby over the easement would be much less visible and therefore much less intru-
sive than a passersby at the water's edge (public property) when the tide was low enough to
permit it. Id. at 3157 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
106. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
107. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3145. The opinion suggests the special importance of the sub-
stantially advance test when a land use technique (such as a mandatory dedication or exaction
plan) mandates property transfers: "We are inclined to be particularly careful about the term
'substantially' where the actual conveyance of property is made a condition to the lifting of a
land use restriction, since in that context there is heightened risk that the purpose is avoidance
of the compensation requirement, rather that the stated police power objective." Id. at 3150.
See generally F. BOSSELMAN & STROUD, DEVELOPMENT EXACTIONS Addendum to Ch. 4
(1987).
108. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3146-47.
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significant effort, Justice Scalia then closely examined the "fit" of the
commission's purpose in requiring the condition and the terms of the
condition itself.109 He concluded that all but one purpose was "implausi-
ble" and that there was "nothing to" the commission's police power jus-
tification.1 0 The problems purportedly generated by the development
proposal, and mitigated by the access condition, were diminutions of vis-
ual and "psychological" beach access, whereas, the condition itself man-
dated lateral access. The only real purpose, in Scalia's view, was to
obtain a government easement without compensation under the guise of
attempting to mitigate an effect of reduced visual and psychological ac-
cess to the coast brought about by the plaintiffs' building plans."'
The Brennan-Marshall dissent focused primarily on what it properly
saw as an unprecedented strict scrutiny of the regulatory measure.1 12 All
police power review cases, argued the dissenters, have used a minimum
rationality standard-could the state have reasonably decided that the
enactment furthered legitimate public purposes? Instead, the majority
adopted an "unusual demand for a precise match between the condition
imposed and the specific type of burden on access created."11 3 Even
under the strict approach announced by the majority opinion, the dissent
contended that the nexus in this case was "substantial."' 14
The dissent went further than concluding that the access condition
was a reasonable exercise of the police power, under either a strict or
minimum scrutiny standard; it also proceeded to apply the Penn Central
test. This approach, therefore, has two broad facets: examination of
whether an enactment sufficiently furthers a particular legitimate public
purpose 1 5 and then a determination of whether the enactment goes "too
far" '1 6 through application of the three Penn Central standards.
The dissenters' thoughtful discussion of the facts is among the best
in the takings jurisprudence. As to the character of the governmental
action, the opinion points out: the action is a permit condition; the type
of intrusion is minimal; the required easement is extremely narrow; pas-
sage between the two beaches would be impossible at certain times of the
year without the easement; and the related impacts on the landowners
109. Id. at 3148.
110. Id. at 3149.
III. Id. at 3150.
112. Id. at 3151 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 3154 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
114. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 3156-58 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 3158-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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are minimal." 7 As to the economic impact factor, the dissent argued
that permitting the construction of a new house in excess of 2,000 square
feet to replace a deteriorating 500 square feet bungalow would greatly
enhance, not diminish, the parcel's value, even accounting for the access
easement." 8 In addition, the owners themselves benefitted from the
commission's policy that all similar building plans would be approved
only if access is granted; the plaintiffs would be able to walk along the
beach, beyond their own property because of the access rights granted by
nearby property owners.' ' 9 Finally, as to investment-backed expecta-
tions, the dissent viewed Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co. 120 as controlling.
Plaintiffs were aware when they purchased the property of longstanding
and very strict coastline development restrictions including access provi-
sions; consequently, any expectations they had for condition-free devel-
opment were unreasonable.'21
The dissent, in closing, addressed broader policy concerns:
[I]t is important to point out that the Court's insistence on a precise
accounting system in this case is insensitive to the fact that increasing
intensity of development in many areas calls for far-sighted, compre-
hensive planning that takes into account both the interdependence of
land uses and the cumulative impact of development .... State agen-
cies ... require considerable flexibility in responding to private desires
for development in a way that guarantees the preservation of public
access to the coast. They should be encouraged to regulate develop-
ment in the context of the overall balance of competing uses of the
shoreline. The Court today does precisely the opposite, overruling an
eminently reasonable exercise of an expert state agency's judgement,
substituting its own narrow view of how this balance should be struck.
Its reasoning is hardly suited to the complex reality of natural resource
protection in the twentieth century.' 22
III. Tentative Thoughts on the Potential Impact of the 1987
Takings Cases
One fairly obvious conclusion from these cases is that the three-fac-
tor Penn Central approach remains at least verbally intact. Irving, a
unanimous opinion, was decided on those grounds, even though the deci-
sion lacks the analytic precision of earlier cases.
An equally clear conclusion from Irving and Nollan is that the pre-
117. Id. at 3157 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 3158 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
119. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting)
120. 467 U.S. 986, 1005-08 (1984); see supra § I(C)(2)-(3).
121. Nollan. 107 S. Ct. at 3159-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
122. Nollan. 107 S. Ct. at 3161-62 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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1987 analytical approach of looking at the property as a whole rather
than its separate elements has given way to what might be termed an
"unbundling" of property interests for purposes of applying the legal cri-
teria in takings cases. Efforts by the governments to direct the Court's
attention to the limited nature of affected rights (in Irving, the right to
devise, and in Nollan, the right to exclude others from a very small area
of the parcel) were obviously unsuccessful. In the future, the Court may
require specific "tight fit" governmental purposes that justify restrictions
that affect only specific elements of a parcel, even though the limitations
have little effect on the property as a whole.
At the same time, Nollan is authority for the proposition that in at
least some factual situations (query which they will be) the threshold
issue of whether the enactment substantially advances a legitimate state
interest must be resolved before turning to application of the Penn Cen-
tral factors. In some cases, the threshold issue will be answered in the
negative, as was the case in Nollan, thus producing the conclusion that a
taking has occurred.
One of the great uncertainties is how closely the courts will in fact
review enactments under attack as takings. Professor Joseph Sax, for
many years one of the leading academic experts in environmental and
constitutional law, contends that while Nollan has some importance in
bringing California land use practices closer to the national mainstream,
the broader significance of the case will probably be "[n]ot much":
Though the Court says that it will factually examine cases to assure
that government is using its power substantially to advance a legiti-
mate state interest, it makes clear that it continues to hold a very broad
view of state regulatory authority. The majority explicitly reiterates
the authority to regulate, without compensation, for historic preserva-
tion, for open space, and for environmental protection, reaffirming de-
cisions that had very broadly granted such powers to government.
123
Professor Sax's perspective may prove accurate, but the critical issue of
how closely the court will review facts to determine the nexus between
the goals and the statute's terms remains a central question. Justice
Scalia in Nollan scrutinized the facts with a vengeance. He had the ad-
vantage of an extremely detailed series of factual findings by the defend-
ant coastal commission; the "Findings and Declarations" of the
commission's order mandating the access easement were voluminous,
constituting seventeen single-spaced, legal-sized pages and presumably
representing thousands of hours of planner time. 124 Will courts generally
123. Sax, Property Rights hi the Supreme Court, CALIFORNIA WATERFRONTAGE 3(3)
(1987).
124. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, joint app. vol. 147-68 (1987).
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engage in such searching review in other cases where mandatory dedica-
tions are not a part of the fact pattern? Will other government agencies,
with perhaps less detailed findings and declarations, be able to persuade
courts of a clear nexus between their goals and their regulations when the
coastal commission's seventeen pages failed?
One undeniable impact of the Nollan decision will be the further
enhancement of the already growing significance of professional planners
in the field of land use and zoning regulation. To pass muster, a govern-
mental act will require careful documentation of legitimate purposes and
a close connection between the purpose and the act itself. The principal
dissent in Nollan suggests that in the future, however, the commission
could simply refine its findings to provide the necessary nexus. 25
Given the obvious need for a reasonable degree of predictability in
this area of the law, the court has unfortunately created troublesome con-
fusion in its 1987 cases. Perhaps the greatest uncertainty concerns when
a court should apply the three Penn Central criteria, and when the new
substantially advance legitimate state interests test applies. This Article
has suggested a plausible consistent reading of the two different formula-
tions; indeed, the dissenters in Nollan analyzed the facts under both crite-
ria. But will a majority of the Court also take that approach in future
cases? Only time will tell.
125. Id. at 3161 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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